

Common Criteria

The Cocktail Party Version

NISSC 98
7 October 1998

Tutorial Objectives

- ◆ Provide enough knowledge that you can sound like you know what you are talking about back at the office and at the next Security conference cocktail party
- ◆ Provide enough of an overview so you know what questions to ask
- ◆ Provide enough information that you know where to start

I want this tutorial to be

- ◆ Interactive
- ◆ Light
- ◆ Informative
- ◆ The kick-start you need to being a CC user and enthusiast

Questions to be answered

- ◆ What Is the CC?
- ◆ What Is the CC Not?
- ◆ Where did the CC come from?
- ◆ What are the central notions of the CC?
- ◆ What does the CC mean to me?
- ◆ What is the next step for the CC project?
- ◆ What do I do to get more information?

What is the CC?

- ◆ An internationally agreed framework for expressing IT security
- ◆ A means by which results of IT security evaluations can be recognized across boundaries
- ◆ An impending ISO standard (15408)
- ◆ Here !!!!!

Other CC goals

- ◆ Mutual Recognition of evaluation results through harmonisation of existing security criteria
- ◆ Common Language and Understanding
- ◆ Flexibility in expressing security requirements
- ◆ Framework for criteria evolution

What the CC is Not

- ◆ THE answer to all the IT security questions and problems
- ◆ Simple
- ◆ Noncontroversial
- ◆ Universally adopted
- ◆ The new TCSEC

What - not replacing the TCSEC?

- ◆ The TCSEC was 5 sets of requirements decided by the DoD on what security functions their systems should have - security by mandate
- ◆ The CC provides tools for building reasonable sets of IT security requirements and for specifications of those requirements


More clarification

- ◆ TCSEC = newspaper article (or poem)
- ◆ CC = dictionary (or encyclopedia)

Still more - this is important

- ◆ The TCSEC 'classes' can be rebuilt from the CC encyclopedia
(if you really want to)
- ◆ The CC gives you the building blocks to build the 'classes' that you really need

Where did the CC come from?



CC Sponsoring Agencies

- ◆ US-NSA
- ◆ US-NIST
- ◆ Canada-CSE
- ◆ France-SCSSI
- ◆ Germany-BSI
- ◆ Netherlands-NLNCSA
- ◆ United Kingdom-CESG

Other forces

- ◆ Security is not just for DoD anymore (Computer Security Act)
- ◆ Security is not just for Operating Systems anymore
- ◆ Security is about risk management not risk avoidance
- ◆ Need cost-effective solutions (no deep pockets)

More forces

- ◆ World market - one evaluation accepted by all (minimize cost)
- ◆ Need to compose systems from components
- ◆ Need to interoperate and have networked solutions

ISO involvement

- ◆ CC v2.0 in final committee draft
- ◆ Scheduled for (Final) Draft International Standard (FDIS) by end of October
- ◆ Scheduled for International Standard for May 1999
- ◆ Allows all to have input to the community criteria

Other Sponsoring Organization Tasks

- ◆ Common Methodology
- ◆ Evaluation Schemes
- ◆ National interpretations
- ◆ National discussions
- ◆ Protection Profiles
- ◆ Maintain Evaluated Product Lists
- ◆ Other non-CC but IT Security information

Now for some Meat

CC Concepts

◆ Structure

- | Part 1 Introduction and General Model
- | Part 2 Security Functional Requirements
 - Requirements
 - Application Notes
- | Part 3 Security Assurance Requirements

CC Documentation

PP
Registry

Guidance
Documents

Interpretations/Maintenance

CC Part 1 Introduction and Model

- * Introduction to Approach
- * Terms and Model
- * Requirements for Protection Profiles and Security Targets

CC Part 2 Functional Requirements

- * Functional Classes
- * Functional Families
- * Functional Components
- * Detailed Requirements

CC Part 3 Assurance Requirements

- * Assurance Classes
- * Assurance Families
- * Assurance Components
- * Detailed Requirements
- * Evaluation Assurance Levels

CEM

Key Concepts

- ◆ Component
- ◆ Protection Profile (PP)
- ◆ Security Target (ST)
- ◆ Package
- ◆ EAL
- ◆ Target of Evaluation (TOE)

Components

- ◆ CC has broken down traditional security into inseparable requirements (building blocks)
- ◆ Users can then compose their set of requirements
- ◆ Components can be refined to make more specific (close to specification)

Protection Profile

- ◆ Intended for expression of consumer needs
- ◆ Combination of security functional and security assurance requirements
- ◆ Allows for creation of security standards
- ◆ Assists backwards compatibility
- ◆ *Similar* to TCSEC classes

PP Contents

- ◆ Introduction
- ◆ TOE description
- ◆ Security environment
- ◆ Security objectives
- ◆ IT security requirements
- ◆ Application notes
- ◆ Rationale

Example PPs

- ◆ Role Based Access Control
- ◆ Application Gateway Firewall
- ◆ C2 equivalent
- ◆ DBMS (commercial)
- ◆ Electronic commerce, Smart card
- ◆ FIPS140-1
- ◆ Y2000

Security Target

- ◆ IT security objectives and requirements
- ◆ Functional and assurance measures
- ◆ Wide audience
- ◆ Suitable for products and systems
- ◆ *Similar* to ITSEC ST

ST Contents

- ◆ Similar to PP but add:
 - | TOE summary specification
 - | PP claims
 - | Supporting rationale

Package

- ◆ IT security objectives and requirements
- ◆ Functions OR assurance (e.g. EAL)
- ◆ Wide audience, reusable
- ◆ Suitable for products and systems
- ◆ Similar to ITSEC E-levels

Functions vs. Assurance

- ◆ Function is something that the system does (behavior)
- ◆ Assurance is a means of generating confidence in those functions

Evaluation Assurance Levels

- ◆ Predefined Assurance Packages
- ◆ Agreed set of useful assurances

Target of Evaluation

- ◆ Whatever you are looking at
 - | Product
 - | System
 - | Subsystem

What does all this mean?

◆ Mutual Recognition

- | Schemes recognize each others results
- | Vendors have bigger market with single evaluation
- | 'Formal' - always have choice to accept other results

What does this mean?

- ◆ New criteria means clean slate (?)
- ◆ You can influence the ‘standard’ sets of security specifications developed

Pros by Lynne

- ◆ It's new
 - | Learn from the past to move forward
- ◆ It's flexible
 - | You can define what you need - you are not limited to Big Brother telling you
- ◆ Everyone's doing it
 - | Community is involved and wants to use it

Cons by Lynne

- ◆ It's new
 - | Few people understand it, afraid of unknown...
- ◆ It's flexible
 - | Complex, have to think, easier to have someone else define
- ◆ Everyone's doing it
 - | Hard to keep track of what community is doing, conflicting ideas

Now what?

- ◆ Common Methodology for implementing the CC
- ◆ Maintain and extend the MR ‘arrangement’
- ◆ Add more sponsors
- ◆ Maintain and update CC
- ◆ Provide guidance and interpretations

What should you do next

- ◆ Participate in developing PPs
- ◆ Require CC in procurements
- ◆ Specify products in terms of CC STs
- ◆ Tell us what you think
- ◆ Spread the word

Where to get more info

- ◆ NIST Web Site

- | <http://csrc.nist.gov/cc>

- ◆ CC Support Environment

- | <http://ccse.cesg.gov.uk>

- | Initial prototype by 1 November

- ◆ me - lambuel@bdm.com 410-290-6041

Conclusion

- ◆ The CC is here - it is time to pay attention.
- ◆ It replaces the TCSEC but is something totally different
- ◆ Happy Day plus Ooooh Noooo.
- ◆ It's not over - watch this space.